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Directors’ Duties in Takeovers and 
Enlightened Shareholder Value
Wan Wai Yee
Assistant Professor
September 2011
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Background
• Enlightened shareholder value and s 172 of the 
Companies Act 2006 and impact on takeover 
regulation
• Kraft- Cadbury takeover, late 2009 to mid 2010
– Some problems:
• Short-term speculators / arbitrageurs having 
disproportionate say
• Target directors take short-termist approach
• Wider stakeholders’ interests given short-shrift
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Responses
• London Panel’s consultations and amendments 
to the Takeover Code (2010 – 2011)
• Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
A Long-term Focus for Corporate Britain (Oct 
2010, Mar 2011)
• John Kay review (June 2011) on effect of UK 
equity markets on the competiveness of UK 
businesses
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Questions
• In responding to a bid, what is the scope of duty 
owed by target board to target shareholders?
– Duty to obtain the best price reasonably obtainable in 
the short-time?
• Can the target board consider the interests of 
stakeholders?
• Does the duty of the target board need to be 
changed in order to facilitate long-term wealth 
creation?
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Directors duties in takeovers –
some background
• Fundamental objective of Takeover Code – only 
shareholders have right to determine the merits of offer
• Target board is prohibited from undertaking actions that 
may frustrate bona fide bid
• But attitude of Target board still important, especially when 
shareholdings are dispersed, and considering whether to 
grant access and deal protections (though whittled down in 
recent amendments)
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Target board duties to 
shareholders in takeovers
• No fiduciary duty to shareholders, only fiduciary duty owed 
to the company (Dawson v Coats Paton), in absence of 
special circumstances
• Duty is act with due care not to make misleading 
statements
• Likely duty is to disclose all information relevant to 
shareholders to make decision, Takeover Code GP 2 and r 
23, and likely incorporated into directors’ duties to 
shareholders in takeovers
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Target board duties to 
shareholders in takeovers
• BUT no duty to obtain best price (but cf Heron 
International v Lord Grade)
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Duty to stakeholders in takeovers
• Common law position (prior to s 172): directors justify 
taking into account interests of stakeholders by reference 
to acting in the interests of the company
• Eg takeover of Manchester United Plc (2005) 
• After s 172: flexibility of board is not changed, so long as 
board is considering longer term interests of the 
shareholders
• Takeover Code amendment – price not the only factor but 
Panel decline to give factors
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Duty to stakeholders in 
takeovers 
• Cannot prioritise stakeholders’ interests over 
shareholders’
• Can take into account stakeholders’ interests so long 
as taking into account impact of takeover on the 
company; in fact under Takeover Code, must give 
views on effect of offer and offeror’s intentions on 
various interests, including employment
• Doubtful if breach of s 172 if failure to consider these 
interests, and even if breach, no ability to enforce by 
shareholders or stakeholders
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Criticisms
Inter-related but distinct criticisms:
• Shareholder-centric takeover regulation 
encourages target board to recommend offers 
made at a premium, even if management’s long-
term strategy is more value enhancing
• Target board fails to pay sufficient regard to 
stakeholders’ interests
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Implications
• Assume that short-termism exists, what can or 
should be done?
– Short-termism is not required by either company law or 
Takeover Code
– If widespread misunderstanding, recent amendments 
to Takeover Code (more disclosure, specify price not 
only factor) not sufficient 
– Prescriptively impose on board to consider 
stakeholders’ interests, in light of existing and future 
interests of shareholders?
• Meaningful?
• Enforcement? Scheme of arrangement?
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More fundamental changes?
• Empower target board to protect corporate 
strategy and stakeholders’ interests (US / 
Delaware model)?
• More clout to long-term shareholders or less 
clout to short-term shareholders (London Panel’s 
consultations, ultimately not pursued unless 
company law changes are made)
• Acting and thinking long-term 
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